PRACTICAL PROPHYLAXIS AND APPELLATE
METHODOLOGY: THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE AS A CASE STUDY IN THE
DECISIONAL PROCESS
John J. Gibbons*
INTRODUCTION

It was once assumed that in the conduct of litigation it was undesirable to attempt the resolution of issues essentially collateral to
the main lawsuit. Disputes over how evidence was obtained were considered collateral.' The time, place or manner of obtaining evidence
which met certain minimum standards of reliability was considered
irrelevant to the admissibility of that evidence. In more recent times,
however, we have observed the development of a quite different assumption about the proper criteria for judging the admissibility of evidence.
This development has taken place primarily, though not exclusively,
in the Supreme Court of the United States. The new development is
the use of an exclusionary rule of evidence not to promote reliability
but to induce conduct on the part of persons who are third partiesstrangers to the litigation-principally, though not always, the police.
The new assumption is that the Court, to provide an effective sanction
for the enforcement of norms of conduct which it deems desirable, will
hold inadmissible evidence obtained in the absence of certain prescribed preconditions. The preconditions vary depending upon the
norms of conduct toward which they are directed, but in each instance
the exclusionary rule is the sanction for departure from the norm.
This exotic development has been recognized as a major departure
from the former assumptions about litigation, and it has produced
extensive debate. As the development progressed, the debate has engaged the country's most formidable legal intellects. Their discussion
has been for the most part at the normative level; that is, criticism of
or praise for the Court's decision that a given norm of third-party conduct was sufficiently desirable, when weighed against the cost of excluding trustworthy evidence, to justify both that cost and the cost of
litigating collateral issues. Early in the debate, Holmes and Brandeis,
in a fourth amendment context, spoke of the Government engaging
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in dirty business, 2 to which Cardozo retorted that the commonweal
was made to pay for the constable's dirty conduct, not the constable. 3
In a fifth amendment context and at a later date, Justice Fortas urged
that the roots of the privilege against self-incrimination "go to the nature
of a free man and to his relationship to the state," 4 to which Judge
Friendly retorted that no parent would teach such a doctrine to his
children. 5 Other polemics for or against the norms of conduct chosen
by the Court abound in the literature of the law. We may expect that
in weighing the competing value judgments which the Court by its
opinions engrafts upon the bare bones of the Constitution, the discussion will tend to be polemical. After all, in choosing norms of
conduct the Court has been making major moral choices in the realm
of public order. Such moral choices, whether made by courts or by
legislatures, tend to evoke strongly felt responses.0
An educated guess about the short range future suggests that the
debate over the norms of conduct which the Court has chosen to enforce
by means of the exclusionary rule will intensify and that the Cardozo, 7
2 Dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928), which held that
use of evidence intercepted by means of wiretapping did not violate the fourth amendment, Holmes wrote:
For those who agree with me, no distinction can be taken between the
Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge. If the existing code
does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does
not permit the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed. . . . And if all that I
have said so far be accepted it makes no difference that in this case wire tapping
is made a crime by the law of the State, not by the law of the United States.
Justice Brandeis also dissented, writing:
To prove its case, the Government was obliged to lay bare the crimes committed
by its officers on its behalf. A federal court should not permit such a prosecution
to continue.
Id. at 480.
3 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S.
657 (1926).
4 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967) (dissenting). On another occasion
Justice Fortas found that its roots "tap the basic stream of religious and political principle .... " In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967). Justice Douglas finds a religious source for
a theological justification of the value judgments expressed by the privilege. Garrity v.
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 n.5 (1967) (quoting from Lamm, The 5th Amendment
and Its Equivalent in Jewish Law, 17 DECALOGUE J. 1, 10, 12 (Jan.-Feb. 1967)).
5 Again, while the other privileges accord with notions of decent conduct generally
accepted in life outside the court room, the privilege against self-incrimination
defies them. No parent would teach such a doctrine to his children; the lesson
parents preach is that while a misdeed, even a serious one, will generally be forgiven, a failure to make a clean breast of it will not be.
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37
U. CN. L. REv. 671, 680 (1968).
0 See, e.g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) and the reaction to those cases.
7 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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Friendly, 8 and Weintraub9 side is in the ascendency in influence in
high places. 10
Without plunging into the thicket of that debate at the normative
level, I propose to use the exclusionary rule as a frame of reference for
a few observations on the methodology of the appellate judicial process
as it appears to me at the pragmatic level. Accepting the norms of thirdparty conduct chosen by the Court as desirable, and accepting the
premise that loss of reliable evidence is not too high a price to pay for
the enforcement of those norms, consider the question, "Is the exclusionary rule, where it has been imposed, an effective means for controlling the desired conduct of the target group?"
That basic question suggests some refinements:
1. What sort of information would be useful in determining the
effectiveness of the exclusionary rule?
2. In cases in which the Court announced the rule, did it have
any empirical information in hand from which it could decide
the rule's potential effectiveness?
3. Did the Court ever seriously intend the rule to be an effective
means of controlling third-party conduct, or was its prophylactic justification only a way of sidestepping debate on the
normative level?
4. If the Court seriously intended controlling third-party conduct
by use of the rule, has it acted consistently with that purpose?
Speculation at the pragmatic rather than at the normative level
may be useful in determining whether it is possible to make a costbenefit analysis of those instances where the rule has been adopted.
Such speculation may also shed light upon the methods whereby appellate courts arrive at their decisions, and possibly thereby suggest
areas in which those methods might be improved.
The Supreme Court has imposed an exclusionary rule of evidence
as a means of controlling third-party conduct in five instances:
8 See note 5 supra.

9 See, e.g., State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971); State v. Boykins, 50 N.J.
73, 232 A.2d 141 (1967); Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 141 A.2d 46, cert. denied, 358
U.S. 843 (1958).
10 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (evidence obtained in violation of the
rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) could be used for impeachment purposes);
Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and
Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971). But cf. Pennsylvania v.
Ware, 40 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. April 24, 1972). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting).
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1. The rule excluding evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search or seizure in violation of the fourth amendment.'"
2. The rule excluding evidence obtained as the result of an illegal
12

arrest.

3. The rule excluding admissions obtained while a defendant is
deprived of his liberty in any significant way and has not received warnings about the privilege against self-incrimination
and the right of counsel.'8
4. The rule excluding admissions obtained during a period of
detention in excess of that legally permitted before a prisoner
4
should be presented before a magistrate.'
5. The rule excluding tangible evidence obtained by shocking
methods.'

5

In each of these instances the rule operates to exclude evidence the
admission of which by hypothesis has no adverse effect upon the integrity of the fact-finding process. The evidence is, by definition, perfectly reliable. Exclusion occurs, according to the Court, because
exclusion is a necessary, or at least an appropriate, deterrent to police
conduct deemed antisocial. This is not to say that in arriving at the
normative decision that the given police conduct was antisocial the
Court did not in one instance have reliability very much in mind. In
Miranda, the entire privilege against self-incrimination was extended
from the courtroom to the police station. This privilege includes far
more than prohibition of the "third degree.' ' 6 But although the prod11 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For present purposes electronic intrusions are
treated as searches in violation of the fourth amendment, since Katz, supra, overruled
the "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
12 See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
13 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Although Massiah made a "critical stage"
analysis as a justification for requiring the presence of counsel at a post-indictment interrogation, it was merely a tentative step in the Court's progression to enforcing the privilege
against self-incrimination in the police station. Thus it is not for present purposes treated
as a separate exclusionary rule.
14 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943).
15 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
16 See, e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (applies to a witness in a judicial
inquiry); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (applies to a witness in an administrative investigation); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (applies to a defendant's
failure to take the stand); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920) (applies to a witness
in a civil trial); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (applies to a witness in a
criminal trial); United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1951) (applies to a
witness in congressional proceedings).
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ucts of the third degree were already inadmissible on due process
grounds, 7 the Court was not entirely satisfied with the workings of
the "totality of circumstances" test. 8 Still, under Miranda voluntariness, and hence reliability, is theoretically irrelevant. In the other four
examples of the exclusionary rule referred to, reliability of the evidence
is not a factor, and the stated purpose of the rule is purely and simply
to influence third-party conduct. 19
A

CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL METHODOLOGY

A short case study in appellate methodology will serve as a point
of departure for consideration of the real life utility of the exclusionary rule. How did the Court arrive at its now quite firm conviction that
its deterrent rule actually deters?
The starting point for any discussion of the exclusionary rule as a
prophylactic device is that enigmatic opinion by Justice Bradley in
Boyd v. United States.20 In that case the Government sought forfeiture
of thirty-five cases of glass seized for a customs violation. The owners
made a claim for the goods. The district court, pursuant to the terms
of a statute, ordered the owners to produce the invoices which would
show the quantity and value of the goods, and hence the violation.
The Supreme Court held that the statute pursuant to which the district court had ordered production of the invoices violated both the
fourth and the fifth amendments. It went on to suggest for the first
time, certainly a dictum, that such evidence should be inadmissible in
17 This has been true at least since Brown v. Mississipi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
1s See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 445-58.
19 Use of the exclusionary rule device in Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) offers an
interesting contrast. Although there is language in the opinions reminiscent of the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule in unlawful search cases, the real thrust of the
opinions is entirely toward reliability. The Court was dealing with two separate evidence
questions. Wade and Gilbert involved use, for the truth of the matter asserted, of prior
out-of-court identifications. This classic instance of hearsay testimony was held to be
admissible only if it was made in the presence of defense counsel. Stovall involved use of
non-hearsay in-court identifications which may have been unduly influenced by prior
out-of-court suggestive lineups. The Court prohibited use of such suspect in-court identifications, in cases where there was undue out-of-court suggestion, on due process grounds.
These exclusionary rules are directed at the integrity of the fact-finding process, not at
influencing third-party conduct. The empirical basis for the Court's conclusions about
reliability of eyewitness identification testimony is hardly overwhelming. But lawyers
and judges have been dealing with issues of reliability of evidence for centuries. It is likely
that the materials relied on, culled principally from studies of reported cases, had a fairly
firm basis in fact even if no scientific behavioral science methods were used in its collection.
20 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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subsequent proceedings. 21 Deterrence of illegal searches and seizures
was, however, the farthest thing from Justice Bradley's mind. He postulated that personally owned papers were protected by the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. 22 To compel their production in
court even by the equivalent of a valid subpoena, he said, would be
contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to
the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an
American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide23 the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal
freedom.
While in this instance the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom undoubtedly coincided with the atmosphere which
the federal judiciary thought appropriate in 1886 for the conduct of
business, the exclusionary rule which Justice Bradley envisioned as
operative to exclude personally owned business records from evidence
was that set forth in the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, not a court-fashioned device intended to prevent police interference either with business or with privacy. The Boyd rule, placing
personally owned business papers within the protection of the privilege
against self-incrimination, has had a subsequent troublesome history
all its own.24 But Boyd had nothing to do with prophylaxis against violations of the fourth amendment.
In Weeks v. United States,25 decided in 1914, 28 years after Boyd,
the exclusionary rule took leave of its fifth amendment parent when it
became law with respect to evidence obtained by federal officers as a
result of their violations of the fourth amendment. The Court's justifi21 Id. at 638.
22 Elaborating

on this point Justice Bradley stated:
As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of
offences against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are
within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and of that portion of the Fifth Amendment which
declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself; and we are further of opinion that a compulsory production of
the private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such
a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and
seizure-and an unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 634-35.
23 Id. at 632.
24 See McPhaul

v. United States, 364 US. 372 (1960); United States v. Fleischman,
339 U.S. 349 (1950); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Grant v. United States, 227
U.S. 74 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 US. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
25 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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cation of Weeks still was normative however, not prophylactic. It was
unseemly for the Court to be a participant in the Government's dirty
business. "To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions
of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against
such unauthorized action." 26 In their notable dissents in Olmstead v.
United States,27 Holmes and Brandeis gave expression to the most often
quoted normative justification for the exclusionary rule, stating that
the Government should not "play an ignoble part,' 28 and that the
evidence would be excluded "in order to preserve the judicial process
from contamination. ' 29 Evidence, like butter, apparently was deemed
capable of picking up a taint from the manner it was come by, and the
taint might spoil the whole judicial meal. The example to the public
of judges permitting the Government to profit from the lawbreaking
of its agents would breed contempt for the law and invite anarchy.3 0
There was no suggestion yet that by excluding evidence the Court was
affirmatively promoting good conduct.
In Wolf v. Colorado3 an attempt was made to have the Court
impose the exclusionary rule upon the states in illegal search cases. A
divided Court declined; the majority was content to seek wisdom courtesy of West Publishing Company.3 2 But this time proponents of the
extension of the exclusionary rule to the States produced a "deterrence"
justification. Justice Murphy in his dissent described the results of written inquiries about the extent of police training in 38 randomly selected large cities.33 He received 26 replies, of which he discussed
26 Id. at 394.

U.S. at 469, 471.
28 Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 485.
27 277

31 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
32 In an appendix to the opinion of the Court Justice Frankfurter listed cases, by
state, in which prior to Weeks state courts had opposed the Weeks rule; in which prior
to Weeks they had formulated such a rule; in which since Weeks they adopted such a rule;
and in which since Weeks they rejected such a rule. This listing showed the "weight of
authority" to be against the exclusionary rule.
83 338 U.S. at 44-47. Justice Murphy described his sampling method:
The material which follows is gleaned from letters and other material from
Commissioners of Police and Chiefs of Police in twenty-six cities. Thirty-eight large
cities in the United States were selected at random, and inquiries directed
concerning the instructions provided police on the rules of search and seizure.
Twenty-six replies have been received to date. Those of any significance are
mentioned in the text of this opinion. The sample is believed to be representative, but it cannot, of course, substitute for a thoroughgoing comparison of
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eleven. Of the eleven, he observed that police training with respect to
the rules of search and seizure is extensive in cities in five of the six
states which by state action adopted the Weeks rule, and negligible in
four out of five of the cities in states which had not followed Weeks.
Justice Murphy concluded: "The contrast between states with the
federal rule and those without it is thus a positive demonstration of its
4
efficacy."3
In searching for an empirical basis for a "deterrence" rationale,
the proponents of the exclusionary rule probably were tacitly conceding
that Justice Cardozo's opinion in People v. DeforA5 had cut the normative intellectual underpinnings from under Weeks v. United States
and that some new justification must be produced. 36 Justice Murphy's
rough and ready attempt at an empirical approach, and his broad overstatement of any conclusion which could properly be drawn from his
limited data, are hardly models of behavioral science research. Yet his
attempt was, and is to this day, the only attempt by proponents on the
Court to demonstrate empirically that the exclusionary rule has the
effect upon the target population which is now its most frequently
asserted justification. So, in 1949, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule was decidedly a hypothesis lacking the support of a demonstration; an unproved assumption advanced more or less tenatively in
place of a judicial gastronomic reaction to "tainted" evidence.
Even as late as 1954 judicial faith in the practical effect of the exclusionary rule remained decidedly tentative. Justice Jackson in Irvine
37 wrote:
v. California
What actual experience teaches we really do not know. Our cases
evidence the fact that the federal rule of exclusion and our reversal
of conviction for its violation are not sanctions which put an end
to illegal search and seizure by federal officers ....

The extent to

which [federal] practice was curtailed, if at all, is doubtful ...
There is no reliable evidence known to us that inhabitants of those
present-day police procedures by a completely objective observer. A study of this
kind would be of inestimable value.
Id. at 44 n.5.
84 Id. at 46.
85 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
86 Writing for the Court Justice Frankfurter stated:
Weighty testimony against such an insistence on our own view is furnished by
the opinion of Mr. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y.
13, 150 N.E. 585. We cannot brush aside the experience of States which deem the
incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy
not by way of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence.
338 U.S. at 31-32 (footnote omitted).
87 347 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1954).
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states which exclude the evidence suffer less from lawless searches
and seizures than those of states that admit it.
In 1955, however, Justice Murphy's unproved hypothesis began to take
on the appearance of a law as certain in its operation as Newton's laws
of motion. In that year Justice Roger Traynor wrote his justly famous
opinion in People v. Cahan.8 He undertook the intellectual rehabilitation of the Weeks rule, upon which Cardozo's Defore opinion had inflicted grievous injury.
People v. Cahan is probably the single most influential opinion
ever written in support of the exclusionary rule. It asserts as fact that
the adoption of the exclusionary rule "will discourage" illegal searches
and seizures, and "will also arouse public opinion as a deterrent to...
law enforcement officers who allow criminals to escape by pursuing
them in lawless ways." 39 Unlike Justice Murphy, however, Justice
Traynor made no attempt whatsoever to build an empirical foundation
for these factual assertions. But since People v. Cahan the "deterrence"
assumption has had a life of its own.
In Elkins v. United States4° the Court rejected the "silver platter"
rule, which had previously permitted the federal Government to use
evidence illegally seized by state officers. Referring to deterrence as
"the basic postulate of the exclusionary rule, '41 Justice Stewart conceded
that
[e]mpirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants
of states which follow the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless
searches and seizures 42than do those of states which admit evidence
unlawfully obtained.
By Mapp v. Ohio,4 8 which overruled Wolf v. Colorado, Justice
44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
89 Id. at 449, 282 P.2d at 914.
40 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
41 Id. at 217.
42 Id. at 218. Relying, as did the majority in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948),
on West Publishing Company as a resource, Justice Stewart took comfort in the fact that
"[t]he movement towards the rule of exclusion [in the States] has been halting but
seemingly inexorable." Id. at 219 (footnote omitted). He made no reference to an empirical
study which was available. In Illinois, a state which followed the Weeks rule, that rule
failed to prevent a very large number of illegal searches and seizures, at least in gambling,
narcotic and weapons cases. See Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of
the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493 (1952). In the opinion Justice
Stewart claims that pragmatic evidence supports the conclusion that the Weeks rule had
no adverse effect on federal law enforcement. Whatever value the cited evidence, an F.B.I.
Law Enforcement Bulletin written by J. Edgar Hoover, may have in rebutting the claim
of harm to law enforcement resulting from the exclusionary rule, it is no evidence at all of
resulting benefit.
43 367 US. 643 (1961).
38
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Clark could look to Elkins as authority for the proposition that the
exclusionary rule, by removing the incentive to disregard constitutional
guarantees, does in fact deter.44 In Linkletter v. Walker, holding Mapp
v. Ohio to be non-retroactive, the exclusionary rule is described as "the
only effective deterrent to lawless police action." 45 Linkletter may be
regarded as an abandonment of the Court's earlier normative or gastronomic premises for a rule rejecting "tainted" evidence. If the "tainted"
evidence were to be rejected on the ground that its use would somehow
cause indigestion in the judicial process, a rule of non-retroactivity
would have no place at all. The line was drawn at searches conducted
after the date of Mapp v. Ohio,4 6 making it clear that deterrence in
the future was now the Court's basic, and perhaps its only, articulated
premise for the rule.
Thus Justice Murphy's unproved hypothesis in the course of
twelve years and a handful of reported decisions became a foregone conclusion, and throughout the entire process the only empirical data referred to by proponents of the rule in the Court was that contained
in 11 out of 26 responses to Justice Murphy's questionnaire to 38 of the
nation's approximately 40,000 police agencies. 47 Yet the Court was
apparently so satisfied with such methodology that by 1968, in Terry
v. Ohio, Chief Justice Warren wrote of the rule:
[I]ts major thrust is a deterrent one [citing Linkletter v. Walker]
•..and experience has taught that it is the only effective deterrent

to police misconduct in the criminal context ....48
Presumably, Chief Justice Warren was referring to the experience data
collected by Justice Murphy. He referred to no source outside the
49
reported decisions for evidence of such experience.
But in defense of proponents of the exclusionary rule, it does not
follow that because its presumed benefit has not been demonstrated it
44 Id.

at 656.
45 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
46 Id. at 639.
47 This number of police agencies is the estimate of THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
Socirry 91 (1967).
48 392 US. 1, 12 (1967) (emphasis added).
49 Whatever the experience data collected by Justice Murphy may have taught about
the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent, that data taught nothing at all
about other deterrents to police misconduct. The Court has never seriously explored the
effectiveness of other deterrents. Possibly Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), points in new directions. But there is need for an empirical approach
before new varieties of deterrents are wholeheartedly embraced. See Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 673 (1970).
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must necessarily be rejected. Arguments against its application have
emphasized the social cost of the loss of reliable evidence. 50 Opponents
such as Wigmore, 51 Cardozo, 52 and Weintraub 53 certainly are acknowledged experts in the operation of the adversary fact-finding process.
Their expert opinion, that the rule by excluding reliable evidence has
been harmful to that process, is entitled to great consideration.
Justice Stewart's conclusion in Elkins that the Weeks rule has not been
demonstrated to have been disruptive of the administration of criminal
justice by the federal Government is at least a somewhat contrary
expert opinion. 54 Proponents and opponents alike would, I think, concede at least some cost in the loss of otherwise reliable evidence and in
the time spent on the trial of collateral issues. But it is not enough
to concede the cost of the rule. Before a cost-benefit analysis may be
made, opponents as well as proponents should do more than guess
whether the sanction of exclusion motivates the target population
toward the hoped for social gains. The debate has been carried on as
if the actual effect of the rule on third-party conduct may be either
assumed or disregarded.
This case study in the development of what is by now a fundamental, although controversial, assumption underlying a whole series
of important decisions regulating the criminal justice system, should
produce a certain disquietude about the appellate methodology of the
Supreme Court. Yet, being fait about it, in this instance of appellate
methodology the Court did precisely what all appellate courts usually
do. Proceeding on a case-by-case basis it assumed that anything it
really needed to know could be found in, or deduced from, previous
reported decisions. It pursued the method which, with few notable
exceptions,55 has been taught to the legal profession in the law schools.
That method is essentially a priori and unaccommodating to empirical
approaches. At its brilliantly intuitive best it has on occasion revealed
50 See especially Chief Justice Weintraub's opinions in State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586,
279 A.2d 675 (1971); State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 232 A.2d 141 (1967); and Eleuteri v.
Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 141 A.2d 46 (1958).
51 8 J. WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 2184a, at 51 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
52 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
53 See cases cited note 50 supra.
54 See note 42 supra.
55 Professors Harry Kalven, Jr., Dallin Oaks, and Hans Zeisel, all of the University
of Chicago Law School, are perhaps the most notable exceptions among the law teachers.
See, e.g., KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUCHHOLZ, DEL.AY
IN THE COURT (1959); Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury and the Death Penalty, 33 U.
CHi. L. REv. 769 (1966); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHi. L. REv. 665 (1970).
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truths about individual and social man that no collection of data ever
will match. When a choice of rules is directed, however, not at illuminating the past conduct or at controlling the future conduct of parties
to a lawsuit, but at controlling the future conduct of third parties,
strangers to the lawsuit, more than intuition is required. This is
especially the case where some adverse consequence of one choice of
rules probably is acknowledged by proponents and opponents alike.
It is not the case that a little exclusionary rule, like a little chicken
soup, may not help but can't hurt.
DEFINING THE UNIVERSE

Once the Court convinced itself that an exclusionary rule of
evidence was an effective sanction against undesirable third-party conduct, a mushroom growth sprang from the original spore idea. If an
exclusionary rule could effectively deter the police from violating the
fourth amendment, obviously such a rule could deter or induce other
conduct as well. The Court need only define a norm of conduct and
require adherence to that norm as a precondition to admissibility.
The troops in the field would then fall in line. The approach was something like the imposition of a documentary stamp tax. 56 The court
prescribed a precondition to admissibility, analogous to the affixing of
a stamp; if the prescribed stamp had not been affixed the evidence could
not be used regardless of reliability. This would induce the police to
buy the stamp.
In Massiah57 the chosen stamp was notice to and presence of
counsel at a post-indictment interrogation. By Miranda the stamp for
assurance that the privilege against self-incrimination actually was at
work in the police station had been recast into a ritualistic warning. The
basic stamps for fourth amendment purposes were search warrants and
arrest warrants. Here, though, the Court permitted many substitute
stamps. 58 In Mallory and McNabb the chosen stamp was prompt ar56 For a discussion of state and federal stamp tax statutes as they affect admissibility

see J. WIGMORE, supra note 51, at § 2185.
57 Massiah v. United States, 377 US. 201 (1964).
58 The Court has relaxed the search warrant requirement

to permit searches inci-

dent to valid arrests, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); searches of readily
removable motor vehicles when probable cause exists to believe they contain fruits or
instrumentalities of crime, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), Carroll v. United States,

267 U.S. 132 (1925); and searches consented to either by the subject himself or, in limited
circumstances, by a third party, Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). See generally Comment, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 33 U. CHI. L. Rv. 797 (1966); Comment,
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raignment. 59 In Rochin6° the chosen stamp was the absence of shockingly
abusive physical examination. Each of these cases is a normative judgment that law enforcement authorities ought to act in a certain way in
order to protect a certain federal constitutional interest. Each made
conformance to the norm a precondition to admissibility of evidence.
What is not quite so clear is the relationship between the "stamp" of
admissibility chosen by the Court and the federal constitutional interest
being protected by requiring adherence to the chosen norm.
Before one can weigh, empirically or deductively, the prophylactic
effect of the rule in any of the instances in which it has been applied,
the first problem is the definition, with some precision, of the prophylaxis sought to be achieved. What conduct, and whose, is sought to
be prevented or induced? This is not one question, however, but several.
Who is the target population? In warrantless searches it may be the
detective division; in illegal arrests it may be the detective division,
the vice squad, the patrol division or the traffic division. The Miranda
rule includes several target populations: the interrogating police, the
interrogated defendants, and the bar. The targets of Mallory and Rochin
are fairly clear. The police authorities who have a person in custody
must bring that person before a magistrate promptly, and may not use
inhumane devices to recover tangible evidence from his person.
Upon agreement about the target population, the question arises,
precisely what does the Court want it to do or refrain from doing. As
I hope to demonstrate, the expression of its intention in this respect has
sometimes been at least ambiguous.
TESTING EFFECTIVENESS

Once the Court's universe-the target population and the desired
conduct-has been determined and accepted, two approaches for
testing deterrent effectiveness come to mind. One is to attempt, inductively, to measure the actual effect of the rule in producing conformance to the accepted norm by the target population. The other is
to speculate, deductively, whether the Court has, by such qualifications
to the rule, or by the preconditions to admissibility which it has attached, acted consistently with its accepted norm. These two approaches
Effective Consent to Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1964). The valid arrest
exception depends upon the local law of arrest. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
59 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943).
60 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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pursued simultaneously may lead to some tentative conclusions as to
when the exclusionary rule will act as an effective prophylactic device.
Fortunately, in recent years the absence of an empirical foundation
for the several applications of the exclusionary rule has resulted in
efforts at research to provide the missing data. From some of those
efforts enough information is available to suggest, in a very tentative
way, guides as to when an exclusionary rule may be employed with
serious deterrent intention.
Three of these efforts at empirical inquiry developed in the wake
of Miranda. One, concentrating on the effect of the Miranda rule on
police conduct and law enforcement, was conducted by observers stationed in the police department of New Haven, Connecticut, by the
Yale Law Journal in the summer of 1966 following announcement of
that decision. 61 A second study, using somewhat different research
methods, was conducted by the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure of the Georgetown University Law Center. It measured the attempt to implement Miranda in the District of Columbia by studying
the role played by defense counsel at the station house, and by determining the effect of these warnings upon the defendant's perception
of his legal rights.6 2 This study relied primarily upon questionnaires
to and interviews of defense attorneys and defendants rather than on
station house observations. The First New Haven Study also addressed
itself to the effect of the warnings upon the defendant's conduct, but
was limited to observed effect rather than interviews or questionnaires.
Another New Haven study was conducted by means of interviews of a
group of draft protestors subjected to interrogation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation after a Mirandawarning had been administered
to them. 3 The research method of this Second New Haven Study thus
was closer to that pursued in the District of Columbia.
Without claiming the qualifications to pass judgment upon the
behavioral science methodology of any one of the three studies, this
much can be said: the information thus gathered is a good deal more
extensive, and probably a good deal more reliable, than that upon
which Justice Murphy relied in 1949. In any event, these studies are the
best we have by which to test the Court's prophylactic premises.
61 See Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.

1519 (1967) [hereinafter cited as First New Haven Study].
62 See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's
Capitol: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. REv. 1347 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as District of Columbia Study].
63 See Griffiths, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Second New Haven Study].
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In Miranda the Court had three target groups in mind. First, it
assumed that the police should, and would, give defendants in custody
adequate and effective warnings of their rights, and would refrain from
interrogation if a defendant at any time expressed an interest in counsel.
Second, the Court, having made the normative judgment that the full
privilege against self-incrimination should be operative in the police
station, assumed that if a defendant were so informed he would act in
his own self-interest by exercising the privilege, at least until his attorney advised him that his best interest lay elsewhere. Third, it assumed
that the bar would somehow accommodate to the Court's normative
judgment that the full privilege against self-incrimination should be
operative in the police station, and would somehow be there at the appropriate time. Each of these separate targets, the Court assumed, would
be motivated, directly or indirectly: the police by the sanction of the
exclusionary rule; the defendants by the ritualistic four-part warning;
the bar by something or other. How valid do these premises appear in
the light of the limited measured experience now available?
First, how effective was the sanction of non-admissibility in motivating the police to give the warning, and to refrain from interrogation
if the defendant expressed the wish to remain silent until he had
counsel? The report on the District of Columbia Study concludes:
From the... data, it is evident that, during the year following
the Court's decision in Miranda, the police in the District of
Columbia were reported as not having given arrested persons anywhere near the complete battery of warnings required, not only by
the Miranda decision64 itself, but also by the Police Department's
own General Order.
The District of Columbia Study, which collected data principally from
defense attorneys and defendants, did not isolate the reasons for noncompliance. The first New Haven Study, which obtained its data
principally from police sources, established:
For the sample as a whole, persons suspected of more serious crimes
were given more adequate advice of their rights than those suspected of less serious crimes ....

[D]ata showed no statistical rela-

tionship between the availability of evidence and the giving of
warnings. But if we look only at the 56 suspects accused of more
serious crimes, our data suggest-although not to a statistically
significant degree-an interesting and highly rational set of priorities for giving the advice of rights....
The suspect of a serious crime was most likely to get a more
adequate warning in the cases where the police had enough evi64 District of Columbia Study, supra note 62, at 1364.
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dence to go to trial, but not enough for a conviction. Thus, the
police seemed most careful to insure the admissibility of the suspect's statement when they had a case against the suspect but when
it was not clear that he could be convicted without an incriminating
statement as evidence. The detectives apparently worried less about
the admissibility of the statement if the case seemed open and shut.
...[M]any of the suspects who tried more half-heartedly to
end the questioning were coaxed into talking. Forty-three suspects
expressed some wish to terminate their interrogations. The detectives continued to question 17. The detectives' compliance with
this aspect of the Miranda decision was strongly related to the
seriousness of the crime and the amount of evidence available
prior to questioning. 65
The First New Haven and the District of Columbia Studies are consistent in the observation that police compliance was nowhere near
universal. In addition, the First New Haven Study goes far toward
establishing that the reason for noncompliance is related directly to
the nature of the sanction.
Miranda was not effective in imposing upon the police a generally
adhered to norm of conduct. It was, however, effective in motivating the
police to compliance with the norm in those cases-serious offenses
where an admissible statement was necessary in order to go to trial
-where the sanction of inadmissibility was quite directly related to
the end of the police activity. But not otherwise. The First New Haven
Study suggests strongly:
Rule I: The exclusionary rule of evidence will be effective as
a means of controlling third party conduct only where there
is a very direct relationship between the sanction of inadmissibility and the immediate object of the third-party conduct sought to be controlled.
If Rule I is a valid conclusion as to how the police will react to an
exclusionary rule of evidence, then it should be useful in determining
when, in other situations, exclusion of evidence is likely to be effective.
The case for such use should not be overstated, for in most other applications of the exclusionary rule there is, so far, little empirical data
against which Rule I may be tested.
There is, however, some such data with respect to the Weeks-Mapp
rule. Moreover, that data was available in 1959 when Justice Stewart
wrote Elkins v. United States, and in 1961 when Justice Clark wrote
65 First New Haven Study, supra note 61, at 1552-55 (footnotes omitted).
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Mapp v. Ohio. Students at Northwestern University Law School in
1950 made a study of motions to suppress in the Chicago, Illinois court
which handled gambling, narcotics, and certain weapons charges.16
Illinois had by then long followed the Weeks rule. The study established
that of 5,848 defendants in gambling charges, 77 percent made motions
to suppress and 99 percent of these motions were granted. In no case
was a conviction secured after a successful motion. Thus, for 76 percent
of the defendants in gambling cases a successful motion to suppress
based upon illegal police conduct disposed of the case. In 288 narcotics
cases, 19 percent of the defendants made suppression motions and 100
percent of those were granted. In 513 weapons cases, 28 percent of the
defendants made suppression motions and 91 percent of these were
granted. This study alone should have suggested to the Court that its
deterrent rule did not always deter and that further investigation of
the behavior of policemen was in order.
A follow-up study by Professor Oaks67 of gambling, narcotics, and
weapons cases for 12 sample days in the Chicago courts in 1969 found
that in 312 gambling cases 52 percent of the defendants made a
motion to suppress and 86 percent of the motions were granted, disposing of 45 percent of the cases. In 457 narcotics cases, 34 percent of
the defendants made a motion to suppress and 97 percent of these
motions were granted, disposing of 33 percent of the cases. In 188
weapons cases, 36 percent of the defendants made a motion to suppress
and 68 percent of these motions were granted, disposing of 24 percent of
the cases. Why did the Chicago police in 1950, and in 1969 as well,
so consistently run the risk, in these cases, that prosecution would
be terminated by a successful motion to suppress?
The Chicago data reinforces a belief in the likely validity of
Rule I. As the authors of the 1950 study stated:
These figures . . . may indicate that the exclusionary rule is most
effective in discouraging illegal searches in cases involving serious
offenses, where conviction is important. Conversely, where the
police believe that a policy of harassment is an effective means of
law enforcement, the exclusionary rule will not deter their use
68
of unlawful methods.
The sanction, in other words, is simply inoperative where there is no
66 See Comment, supra note 42.

67 See Oaks, supra note 49, at 681-757.
68 Comment, supra note 42, at 498 (footnotes omitted). See also Goldstein, Police
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 547-48 nn.8-9 (1960).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:295

direct relationship between the admissibility of evidence and the
immediate object of the police activity.
Both the Miranda data and the Wade-Mapp data, limited as they
are, should at least arouse suspicions as to the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule in controlling electronic surveillance. Yet so much has
the deterrence rationale become an article of faith that even Congress
accepted it when it enacted the title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.69 It is no more sound to arrive deductively
at the conclusion that the sanction of inadmissibility will make police
refrain from electronic invasions of privacy than to arrive deductively
at the conclusion that the same sanction will make the police give
Miranda warnings or refrain from illegal searches. If obtaining admissible evidence is the direct object of the "bug" or "tap" the police
will follow the rules. If prevention or harassment are primary motivations the sanction probably will be ineffective.
The District of Columbia Study and the First and Second New
Haven studies also shed light upon the effect of Miranda on the second
target group-the defendants. Here we turn from a consideration of the
effectiveness of the sanction, inadmissibility, to a consideration of the
effectiveness of the protective talisman of admissibility-the stamp
which must be purchased-in promoting the underlying federal constitutional policy. In Miranda, the chosen protective device is a fourpart warning of the combination of fifth and sixth amendment rights
deemed appropriate to make effective the Court's normative judgment
that the privilege against self-incrimination should be operative in
the police station.
The District of Columbia study was carried out in conjunction
with a Precinct Representation Project conducted by the Junior Bar
Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia and the
70
Neighborhood Legal Service Project of the local antipoverty agency.
Whenever an accused at a precinct police station desired counsel but
had no counsel of his own, the police were to place a call to a central
switchboard manned twenty-four hours a day. The switchboard operator
would then notify a volunteer attorney who would go to the appropriate
precinct. Thus, in the District of Columbia study, attorneys at the
police station stage were far more readily available than is ordinarily
the case. Moreover, the Police Department by a general order prescribed
strict compliance both with the Miranda warning requirements and the
69 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515 et seq. (1970). See 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2112, 215363 (90th Cong., 2d Sess.).
70 District of Columbia Study, supra note 62, at 1350.
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termination of questioning requirement, and imposed on the police the
duty to notify the Precinct Representation Project of each request for
counsel. In this relatively ideal environment one would think, and
the Court in Miranda obviously thought,7 1 that most defendants once
properly warned would, in accordance with their self-interest, remain
silent and request a lawyer. Yet the reporters on the District of Columbia study conclude:
In contrast to the second premise that the defendants would
be able to have a sufficient basis from the warnings to decide in
their own best interest whether to remain silent and to choose
counsel, the defendants were loath to use attorneys and frequently
gave statements to the police because of their inability to apply
Miranda to their own circumstances. Over nine-tenths of those
arrested for felonies and serious misdemeanors did not request
counsel; nor did well over three-quarters of those who said they
had not been given the station-house counsel warning, over onethird of those who stated they had been given the warning, or over
one-third of those who reported having been given the warning
and having understood it. Moreover, two-fifths of the defendants
interviewed said they had given statements to the police. The
defendants who gave statements constituted over one-half of those
who stated they had not been given the silence warning, two-fifths
of those who reported having been given the warning, and over
two-fifths who said they had been given the warning and understood it.
In our study we found that, aside from the large number of
defendants who understood the warnings and acted accordingly, a
small group of defendants misunderstood the warnings and a
significant percentage, who had a cognitive understanding of the
warnings, nevertheless failed to appreciate their
significance and
72
lacked the ability of applying them in context.
These findings are consistent with the findings of both the First and
Second New Haven Studies 73 that the Miranda rules, when followed,
affect interrogations but slightly.
The Second New Haven Study is highly significant, since it involved a group of well-educated, intelligent, and willful people who
were given the warning set forth in the standard waiver of rights form
used by the F.B.I., and who were interrogated in the non-coercive atmosphere of their own homes. Most of those interrogated before the aca384 U.S. at 467.
72 District of Columbia Study, supra note 62, at 1394-96.
73 First New Haven Study, supra note 61, at 1614; Second New Haven Study, supra
note 63, at 308.
71
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demic community at Yale took steps to reinforce the effect of the
warnings by other steps, 74 signed the waiver form and gave statements
without obtaining legal advice. 75 The three studies point up the complexities and subtleties of interrogation, and the results suggest:
Rule II. The choice of a talisman to be affixed as a precondition
to admissibility must be tailored in some meaningful way
to the ultimate constitutional interest or policy sought to be
implemented, in the light of the known behavior patterns of
persons whose conduct is expected to be affected.
In part, at least, the failure of the Miranda rule to make the privilege
against self-incrimination fully operative in the police station has occurred because the Court, operating entirely without empirical guidance from the behavioral sciences, made a wrong guess as to the effect
of a warning upon the behavior of its second target group, the defendants.
The authors of the report on the Second New Haven Study suggest a facile remedy:
For full achievement of Miranda's values, a suspect needs even
more than a sympathetic explanation before his interrogation-he
needs a sympathetic advocate during the interrogation. Only in this
way will most suspects be able to assert a measure of control over

the situation, overcome inevitable nervousness, and avoid the
impact of perceived (but irrelevant) social rules operating in a
situation structured and manipulated by a professional interrogator.78
They suggest, in other words, that all interrogation conducted outside
the presence of counsel be made subject to the exclusionary rule. One
would hope that proponents of the value judgments embodied in
Miranda will not leap at this proposed substitute talisman for admissibility, because it, like the present talisman, represents no more than a
guess as to defendants' likely behavior. The words "only in this way
will most suspects be able to assert" are reminiscent of Chief Justice
Warren's "experience has taught that it is the only effective deterrent." 77
Neither New Haven Study discloses how defendants will act if
attorneys are present, or how the attorneys will act. Both show only
how defendants act when attorneys are absent, and tend to establish
that the Miranda four-part warning is an ineffective means of enforcing
74 These steps are discussed in Second New Haven Study, supra note 63, at 302-19.
75 Id. at 310.
78 Id. at 318-19 (emphasis added).
77 See note 48 supra, and accompanying text.
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the privilege against self-incrimination at the police station. Neither study
can be relied upon to establish that the privilege would be asserted
more frequently if counsel were present. The Second New Haven Study,
true, established that when something more was added to the warnings
assertion of the privilege became more pronounced. This something
more was not, however, the presence of counsel. It was rather the creation by the academic community at Yale of a set of group values under
which it became socially acceptable for draft protestors to assert the
privilege against self-incrimination; in other words, to adopt a set of
group values in that instance different from the values learned from
their parents.78 There is no empirical data that I know of from which,
in the absence of group reinforcing values such as were present among
the later group of draft protester interviewees in New Haven, the
presence of an attorney would be effective in preventing the operation
of whatever social or psychological forces operate to induce people to
respond to interrogation.
One empirical study of the Mapp rule illustrates how the Court's
failure to obtain behavioral science data before fashioning a: talisman
of admissibility has led to unanticipated results in the field. Shortly
after the Mapp decision students at Columbia Law School made a
79
"before and after" study of the effects of the rule in New York City.
They analyzed the evidentiary grounds for arrest and subsequent disposition of misdemeanor narcotic cases for six months before and six
months after Mapp. The data were obtained from reports filed by the
arresting officer recorded in case files in the criminal courts. This study
established that in the comparable periods there was a 32 percent decrease in instances where the Narcotics Bureau reported evidence as
"hidden on the person," and a 26 percent increase in instances where
the evidence was reported as dropped or thrown on the ground. In the
Uniform Division the "hidden on the person" category decreased by
22 percent while the "dropped or thrown" and "visible in hand" categories increased 7 percent.80 Observers of these phenomena attribute it
to police lying in order to bring the evidence within the "incident to
a lawful arrest" exception to the warrant requirement, 8 ' and thus avoid
78 See notes 5 & 48 supra, and accompanying text.
79 Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search and Seizure Practices in Narcotic Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 87, 92 (1968).
80 Id. at 94-95. See generally Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases:
A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971).
81 Kuh, The Mapp Case One Year After: An Appraisal of its Impact in New Yorh,
148 N.Y.L.J. 4 n2 (1962); Younger, Constitutional Protection On Search and Seizure Dead?,
3 TRIAL 41 (Aug./Sept. 1967).
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the effect of the exclusionary rule. This assumption seems more reasonable than that in the six months following Mapp the defendants
changed their habits.
The talisman of admissibility in the Wade-Mapp situation is a
warrant requirement, but that requirement has been so hedged by exceptions 2 that the persons whose conduct is expected to be affected
-in this case the police-are free to counterfeit other stamps of admissibility. The exceptions have so watered down the talisman of
the warrant requirement that it has lost its intended relationship to
the implementation of fourth amendment rights of privacy and freedom
from police harassment. If the police are in fact lying about where
they found the evidence in these narcotics "dropsy" cases, then it
would seem that these are instances in which Rule I is already in
operation; that is, the police are motivated by a need for admissible
evidence and the sanction of inadmissibility operates on their conduct.
But the talisman for admissibility apparently has not been tailored to
the constitutional end sought to be protected in the light of actual,
rather than assumed, behavior.
The Columbia study of New York police behavior patterns in
cases where the police are looking for admissible evidence suggests
some interesting speculation about the reliability of affidavits used to
obtain search warrants. How often, one may ask, have the courts
admitted evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant issued on
the basis of a tip from a "reliable" informantn which was, in fact, no
more than a reliable, but illegal, electronic device.
Returning to Miranda, and to the Court's third target group,
the attorneys, the District of Columbia Study discloses that for a short
time the decision motivated an enthusiastic group of volunteer at82

See note 58 supra, and accompanying text.

88 See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.

410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Neither at the magistrate stage nor at the
later suppression stage do the courts give very careful scrutiny to the affiant's statements,
so long as they fit within the talismanic formula stated in Aguilar, explicated in Spinelli,
and watered down in Harris. See L. TIFFANY, D. McIm-Rrl & D. RoTENBERG, DracroN OF
CRIME 118-20 (1967); Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for
Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARv. L. REv. 825, 828-30 (1971). The Harris decision may be
evidence that the present majority on the Court believe that once the police have gone
to a magistrate and obtained a warrant the intended prophylaxsis of the exclusionary
rule has been accomplished, and that some device other than exclusion of evidence will
have to be created to control the degree of care with which the magistrates scrutinize
police affidavits. Such an approach is consistent with a deterrent rationale for the exclusionary rule. That rationale was not that the exclusionary rule would improve the performance of magistrates but that it would force the police to go to the magistrate before
engaging in an invasion of privacy.
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torneys to try to be at the station house-for the purposes of claiming
the privilege against self-incrimination-at the critical time. The Precinct Representation Project was from the start, however, recognized to
be of short duration. The Junior Bar which manned the project suggested
that a volunteer program was inadequate and that a permanent system
of full-time paid attorneys would be an improvement. The possibility
that this suggestion will become a very high priority budget item, as
compared, say, with increased personnel in the probation and parole
areas, seems remote.
But more fundamentally, the suggestion assumes without demonstration that paid attorneys will accomplish more than did volunteers.
And if the results of the District of Columbia Study accurately report
the situation the voluntary attorneys accomplished little. The report
summarizes the findings about attorneys:
Finally, in contrast to the third premise that the presence of
attorneys in the police station would protect defendants' fifth
amendment rights, the attorneys found it difficult to define adequately their role at the station house. They were often unavail.
able at the critical point in time necessary to protect defendants'
rights because of the delays between the time of arrest and the
time the attorney arrived at the station and because of the reported
failure of the police to curb interrogation until the defendant
could have access to an attorney. Moreover, because so few attorneys even thought of telephoning the defendant directly before
setting out for the station house and because so many spent so
short a time with the defendant once there, little headway was
made in mitigating the consequences of the time delays and police
practices.8 4
Many attorneys in the Project came to believe that very few interrogations actually were taking place, though in fact the pattern of
interrogation actually had not changed significantly, especially in
serious cases. The report on the District of Columbia Study points out:
The dilemma raised by the juxtaposition of the realities of
interrogation against the attorneys' assessment of their role is a
very real one. Unless the lawyer is at the police station when an
interrogation takes place, the defendant is very likely to waive his
rights to silence and give incriminatory statements; yet since the
police have need to interrogate only a limited number of suspects,
providing a lawyer for each person arrested, or even for each person who requests counsel, makes the lawyer feel that he is wasting
his time.8s
84 District of Columbia Study, supra note 62, at 1395.
85 Id. at 1391.
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The experiences of the attorneys in the District of Columbia Study,
therefore, suggests:
Rule III: The operation of the chosen talisman for admissibility
should not depend for its intended prophylaxis upon the
activity of third persons who will not be motivated by the
sanction of inadmissibility and who are effectively beyond the
practical control of the court.
Attorneys are effectively beyond the practical control of the court,
especially when it comes to getting them out of bed at night to go to
the police station. They do not necessarily share the Court's enthusiasm
for extensions of the privilege against self-incrimination. Those in
private practice have other obligations the fulfillment of which is
motivated by profit, of which usually little results from a midnight
trip to the station house. The legislatures which control the purse
strings for publicly employed lawyers are as effectively beyond the
Court's control as are the private lawyers. The Miranda desideratum of
an attorney present at the police interrogation, to advise on the exercise
of the privilege, did not happen because the Court had no means
whereby to make it happen.
So, in the observed world, as distinguished from the world deduced
from successively self-reinforcing appellate decisions, it would seem
from such data as are available that both the deterrent premise for
the exclusionary rule and the chosen talismans for admissibility have
only limited pragmatic relationship to the ends sought to be achieved.
The Miranda exclusionary rule does serve in serious cases, where
a confession is needed for a conviction, to motivate the police. The
warning, however, seems to have had little effect in making the privilege
against self-incrimination operative in the police station. The arrest
rules, where evidence is the immediate object of the attendant search,
motivate the police to do something; to fabricate testimony, if nothing
else. Where harassment or prevention are the objects of police activity,
the Miller-Aguilar-Spinelli rules seem to be inoperative. 86 Probably,
the police react similarly to the Weeks-Mapp-Katz rules. 87 The Miranda
data cast doubt on the effectiveness of Mallory and McNabb as well. But
since brutal treatment to obtain tangible evidence has as its sole object
the obtaining of such evidence, the exclusionary rule in Rochin may
well be pragmatically effective.
But perhaps it is unfair to take the Court at its literal word about
86 See cases cited note 12 supra, and accompanying text.
87

See cases cited note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
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its deterrence rationale, for there are some indications in its decisions
that the justices did not really mean all they seem to have said. If control of third-party conduct is the purpose of an exclusionary rule of
evidence, what, for example, is the justification for any limitations upon
standing to assert a violation? Limiting the persons who may assert the
violation is plainly inconsistent with a deterrent premise; yet the Court
has repeatedly recognized standing limitations on its exclusionary
rules. 8 It is equally difficult, if deterrence is the reason for the rule, to
justify a harmless error exception. The sanction of inadmissibility
should, consistent with the stated reason, be applied to the largest number of cases to which it can be applied; yet the Court has authorized application of a harmless error rule.89 If deterrence is the aim, the
attenuation rule 0 seems inconsistent, since it exempts a substantial
number of violations from operation of the sanction, and thereby encourages the risk of violation in hopes that such evidence as may be
needed to convict will be held to be attenuated from the officer's illegal
conduct. If deterrence is the aim there should be no room.for waiver,
since what presumably is at stake is the public interest in the future
conduct of the police rather than the vindication of individual wrongs;
yet the Court has tacitly recognized the exclusionary rule may be
waived. 9 1
Another basic inconsistency with the assumed premise is the rule
that, although illegally obtained evidence may not be used affirmatively,
it may be used for impeachment purposes.9 2 The impeachment cases
suggest that although the Court has fashioned a deterrence rationale
the justices are in fact moved by the same visceral reactions which
moved Holmes and Brandeis in Olmstead. While it would be dirty
business for the Court to condone affirmative use of illegally obtained
evidence, it would be even dirtier business to condone perjury when
there was in hand perfectly reliable evidence to contradict it. If this
88 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960); cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. granted
sub nom. United States v. Egan, 404 U.S. 990 (1971).
89 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53-54, rehearing denied, 400 US. 856 (1970);
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
See generally Cameron & Osborn, When Harmless Error Isn't Harmless, 1 Asuz. S.L.J. 23
(1971).
90 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308

U.S. 338 (1939).
91 See Birns v. Perini, 426 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971);
Symons v. Klinger, 372 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1040 (1967); cf. Walder
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66 (1954).
92 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.

62 (1954).
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waters down the deterrent effect of the rule, so be it. Perhaps a similar
visceral reaction will set in against the police perjury which Mapp v.
Ohio seems to have encouraged.
But despite these inconsistencies, one cannot seriously doubt that
from time to time, in the procession of cases from Wolf v. Colorado to
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,93 a majority of the justices believed their
exclusionary rule was an effective means for controlling police conduct.
They never acted less consistently with their assumed premises than
in the eight-to-one decision in the "stop and frisk" case, Terry v. Ohio.94
While saying on the one hand that "experience has taught that [the
exclusionary rule] is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct,"95 Chief Justice Warren also recognized that
[r]egardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to
deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the
police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo
successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal....
• . . The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the
police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes,
frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any
evidence from any criminal trial.90
This sounds very much like our proposed Rule I-don't use the sanction
of inadmissibility against conduct not directly related to obtaining
admissible evidence, because it won't work. But no. If the police conduct
violated the fourth amendment the evidence must be inadmissible.
If the evidence is to be admissible the conduct must have been constitutional. Therefore, "[s]uch a [stop and frisk] search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may
properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they
were taken. '97 Thus has the exclusionary rule tail come to wag the
constitutional dog.
The consequence of Terry v. Ohio is not merely that the sanction
of inadmissibility is removed from the courts in their efforts to control
certain police conduct. Since "stop and frisk" searches are now constitutional, the courts have also been deprived, in controlling such
searches, of the still largely unexplored sanctions of damage suits,
injunction actions, and criminal prosecutions. Chief Justice Warren

95
96

403 U.S. 443 (1971).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted).

97

Id. at 31.

93
94
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may well have been right when he said the exclusionary rule is the only
effective deterrent, not because experience has taught us so, but because
the Court, by a narcissistic concentration on elevating its exclusionary
rule to constitutional status, has neglected other remedies.9 8
SOME

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing discussion does not dispute the correctness of the
normative judgments expressed in any individual case, except for
Terry v. Ohio. Others have contended that the Court has no business
legislating social policy such as appropriate police conduct in the
guise of constitutional interpretation. That is not my objection. My
quarrel is with the reliance of the Supreme Court, and indeed of all
appellate courts, on an a priori approach to decisions on questions of
social policy to the exclusion of empirical approaches. The development
of the exclusionary rule as a prophylactic device is only an example
of such reliance. Commenting upon the inevitability of Miranda once
Escobedo v. Illinois99 had been decided, Fred P. Graham, in his book
The Self-Inflicted Wound, writes:
But in approaching Miranda, the Supreme Court did not possess
a legislature's flexibility. Where legislators might have sensed
trouble ahead and would have considered it honorable and proper

to trim their sails, the oral arguments were to show that the Justices
in the majority felt committed by their decision in Escobedo to
move on to a broader rule. A constitutional dialectic had been set
in motion that called for the Miranda decision, yet at no place

along the line did the Justices have an unfettered opportunity to
take into consideration empirical proof as to whether the reform
was needed or what its impact might be.
One of the aspects of the Miranda decision that most upset its

critics was that the Supreme Court majority, apparently satisfied
to find itself locked into its course of action by the dialectic of
Escobedo and its precursors, gave every impression that it was not
interested in this line of argument. It was true that little empirical
data were known about the need for such a rule and its probable
effect, but the Justices showed no interest in the scraps of evidence
that were available. 100
The key word in Graham's criticism is "dialectic." The adoption
98 See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), which probably has discouraged the
development of civil remedies. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) may indicate an interest in alternative deterrents to police wrongdoing.
99 378 U.S 478 (1964).
100 F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLIcrED WOUND 170 (1970).
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of the exclusionary rule in those instances where it has been adopted
as a means for controlling third-party conduct has been a dialectic
exercise in which the Court disregarded such limited empirical data
as was available and showed no interest in learning more from the
behavioral sciences. If in some instances the decisions laid down rules
which effectively promoted the desired constitutional ends, that result happened by chance more than by choice. This method of decisionmaking cannot be sound.
Some critics of the activist Court would say that courts should
confine themselves to deciding cases and controversies rather than attempt to impose norms of conduct on third parties, because courts are
institutionally incapable of obtaining the empirical data necessary for
making decisions on social policy. 10 ' The position of such critics is as
much the result of a priori reasoning as are the court decisions which
they criticize. It does not follow that because courts have not used the
results of behavioral science research in the past they are incapable of
102
doing so; a good example is Brown v. Board of Education.
Of course, there is a chicken and egg problem. Faced with the
absence of scholarly empirical research in relevant areas and with the
necessity for deciding pressing cases, appellate courts are inevitably
tempted to press on with the materials and methods with which they
are already familiar. At the same time, their very willingness to do so
largely removes the incentive for the academic side of the profession
either to produce some useful behavioral science research or to train
lawyers capable of producing and handling such materials. The responsibility for remedying the situation must be shared by all appellate
courts and by the law schools. But because the Supreme Court is the
preeminent teacher, the primary responsibility for improved appellate
methodology lies with it.
101 See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 11-42, 173 (1970);

supra note 100, at 170.
U.S. 483 (1954). The behavioral science data upon which the Court relied in
overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was introduced in evidence in the lower
court. 347 U.S. at 494.
F.
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